TLP: CLEAR - This information may be shared publicly
eSentire's Threat Response Unit (TRU) compiles the following weekly intelligence overview, providing cybersecurity leaders with expert analysis and insights on the most important events of the past week along with important security tips.
Additional Exploits Impacting N-able N-central Disclosed
2026/11/13
Ongoing Attacks Targeting ScreenConnect Extensions
2026/11/12
N-able N-Central Vulnerabilities Publicly Disclosed
2026/11/09
Bottom Line: Between November 9th and 12th, a security researcher publicly disclosed three exploits impacting N-able N-central, dubbed Able2Shell, 4EverAble2Shell, and Agent2Shell, that can lead to unauthenticated Remote Code Execution (RCE) on impacted devices.
On November 9th, 2026, a security researcher disclosed 33 vulnerabilities within N-able N-central, along with releasing Proof-of-Concept (PoC) exploit code. The release, dubbed Able2Shell, can enable unauthenticated attackers to execute commands on impacted servers. In response to the release, N-able published an advisory, stating that they took hosted N-central environments offline, and recommended that customers with on-premises deployments do the same, while the Able2Shell exploit was assessed. On November 10th, N-able released N-Central 2026.4 Hotfix 2 (HF2) to address Able2Shell, while also confirming that scanning activity associated with the PoC had been identified.
On November 12th, the same researcher disclosed two additional exploits impacting N-central, which were given the names 4EverAble2Shell and Agent2Shell; PoC exploit code was also published for these exploits, as well as confirmation that the exploits work against servers with the N-Central 2026.4 HF2 patch. 4EverAble2Shell is a two-stage exploit chain that first leverages a flaw in Apache Axis (CVE-2026-90436) to achieve command execution as the 'nable' service account, and then chains a flaw in N-central to escalate privileges to root, resulting in unauthenticated Remote Code Execution (RCE) with root privileges. Agent2Shell bundles in several zero-day exploits that can allow an attacker to run commands with SYSTEM privileges on Windows hosts managed by an N-central agent. Exploitation of 4EverAble2Shell has been observed in the wild.
In response to the latest disclosure, N-able published another advisory, confirming that they are assessing the exploits and developing additional remediations. N-able has also stated that "certain N-central features and integrations" have been restricted as a precaution, such as the Intune integration, and have disabled the Legacy API for hosted customers. On-premises customers are advised to ensure that the Legacy API and Intune integration have been disabled, and monitor N-able's status page for further updates and guidance.
The 4EverAble2Shell exploit chains together CVE-2026-90436 and an unidentified local privilege escalation flaw within N-central to achieve root level code execution. CVE-2026-90436 is used as the initial access vector in the exploit as the Legacy API utilizes the end-of-life Apache Axis 1.x SOAP engine. Disabling the Legacy API within N-central removes the entry point for this attack. The Agent2Shell exploit allows for threat actors to execute code on managed endpoint devices, meaning that both this and 4EverAble2Shell can be chained together to compromise Internet-facing N-central servers and endpoints that it manages.
N-able initially recommended that all On-Premises customers take vulnerable servers offline until security patches were applied; this disruptive recommendation indicates the severe potential impact of real-world attacks against Managed Service Providers (MSPs) and downstream customers. The latest recommendation from N-able is to ensure that the patches for Able2Shell are applied, as well as disabling the Legacy API and Intune integration to prevent the initial exploit that is part of the 4EverAble2Shell chain. Organizations that use on-premises deployments of N-central should ensure that these recommendations are applied.
Scanning of Able2Shell has been reported in the wild, along with exploitation of 4EverAble2Shell. Security firm Huntback has identified attacks involving the 4EverAble2Shell exploit within hours of its disclosure and PoC release, used to deploy XMRig Monero coin miners. At the time of writing, there are no reports to suggest that exploitation of Agent2Shell has been identified. As PoC exploit code is publicly available for all exploits, which lower the barrier for threat actors to target vulnerabilities, eSentire's Threat Intelligence team assesses with medium confidence that higher levels of exploitation will be detected in the coming days while organizations are awaiting patch release.
In response to these disclosures, eSentire published an advisory for Able2Shell on November 9th, and another advisory for 4EverAble2Shell and Agent2Shell on November 13th. eSentire's Threat Response Unit (TRU) developed detections within eSentire MDR for Endpoint to identify malicious processes spawning from N-able remote management components and is continuing to track this topic for additional information and detection opportunities.
Bottom Line: CISA has confirmed active exploitation of the high severity OpenSSH vulnerability CVE-2026-123158. As exploitation has been confirmed, it is critical that organizations apply the relevant security patches as soon as possible.
On November 5th, 2026, the OpenSSH project released Portable OpenSSH 10.6p2, to remediate CVE-2026-123158 (CVSS: 8.1). The vulnerability, alternatively referred to as SSHole, is a password authentication bypass in sshd that affects Linux systems using the musl C library with Pluggable Authentication Modules (PAM) disabled. On November 9th, CISA added the vulnerability to the Known Exploited Vulnerabilities (KEV) catalog, confirming real-world attacks.
The vulnerability stems from a logic error in how some Linux systems check passwords. If an attacker enters an unusually long password, between 257 and 1,024 characters, the password check hits an error, and the server wrongly treats that error as a correct match. Accounts that have no password set, such as key-only accounts, are at risk of abuse. The attacker needs no special skills, and Alpine notes that the trick “works every time and needs no retries.” Systems are only at risk if all of the following conditions are met:
A public Proof-of-Concept (PoC) exploit appeared roughly four hours after the fix was released, and exploitation attempts followed almost immediately. Previdian first observed attempts on November 6th and watchTowr reported that the flaw was being used in botnet and cryptocurrency mining activity. GreyNoise recorded its first successful exploitation on November 7th, approximately 40 hours after the fix was released.
SSH is one of the most widely exposed services on the Internet, and the barrier to exploitation is low. A single request with an oversized password is sufficient; no prior access is required, and working public exploit code was available on the day of disclosure. Fortunately, conditions for exploitation lower the overall number of vulnerable devices. To defend against related attacks, organizations are strongly encouraged to identify all systems running musl-based OpenSSH without PAM, including Alpine hosts, container base images, and embedded devices. These devices should be prioritized for immediate patching. If patching is not feasible, organizations can "set PasswordAuthentication no" in the sshd configuration and restart sshd, or restrict SSH access.
In response to this disclosure, eSentire published an advisory on November 9th. eSentire's Managed Vulnerability Service (MVS) has plugins in place to identify vulnerable devices. The Threat Response Unit (TRU) continues to track this topic for additional information and detection opportunities.
Bottom Line: ConnectWise disclosed unauthorized access to ScreenConnect partner accounts tied to five third-party extensions, leading to deployment of rogue ScreenConnect clients and a worm-like toolkit, SCKit.
On November 11th, 2026, ConnectWise published a security advisory warning that threat actors had gained unauthorized access to certain ScreenConnect partner environments. The investigation indicated that the activity was likely associated with abuse of independent third-party extensions capable of executing remote commands through ScreenConnect. At the time of publication, ConnectWise stated that there was no evidence of a vulnerability in ScreenConnect itself and no indication that ConnectWise infrastructure had been compromised. The affected extensions include Labtech Plus, RMM Plus, RMM+, RMM Plus Password Link, and RMM+ Password Link. These extensions provide API-based functionality that allows remote command execution and administrative actions within ScreenConnect environments.
Investigations by Huntress identified an authentication flaw within versions 1.0.31 and 1.0.32 of the RMM+ extension. The extension authenticates requests using a shared access key rather than ScreenConnect user accounts, permissions, or multi-factor authentication controls. Researchers determined that when administrators had never configured an access key, the extension accepted a blank value, effectively allowing unauthenticated access to extension functionality. Evidence collected by researchers indicated that malicious commands were executed across multiple ScreenConnect environments within minutes and that the associated activity was recorded within RMM+ logs.
Once access was obtained, attackers used the ScreenConnect Run Command feature to execute commands on managed endpoints. The initial commands checked for existing ScreenConnect installations and subsequently downloaded an attacker-controlled ScreenConnect installer to victim systems. Following deployment of the rogue client, attackers delivered a malware toolkit known as SCKit. The toolkit consists of multiple PowerShell scripts, batch scripts, command files, and supporting utilities designed to establish persistence. The toolkit contains components designed to steal browser cookies, ScreenConnect session tokens, and authentication data from infected systems. It uses tools such as SQLite utilities to access browser databases and extract credentials that may be used for account hijacking and session replay attacks. Researchers discovered code designed to transfer infection from compromised endpoints to technician workstations and subsequently to additional customer systems accessible through those technician accounts.
According to Huntress, attackers successfully pushed malicious commands to at least 288 endpoints across 48 organizations within approximately 90 minutes. ConnectWise identified roughly 400 partner environments with affected extensions installed and disabled the vulnerable extensions in cloud-hosted environments as a precaution. The deployment of rogue ScreenConnect clients provides attackers with persistent remote access to compromised systems. Simultaneously, the ability to steal browser cookies and ScreenConnect session tokens creates opportunities for credential theft, session hijacking, and unauthorized access to additional resources. For MSPs, the threat is amplified by the possibility that compromised technician workstations could be leveraged to access multiple customer environments.
ConnectWise’s ecosystem has been targeted repeatedly in recent months. In September, CISA added a ScreenConnect client file-transfer flaw (CVE-2026-84869, CVSS: 9.9) to its KEV catalog. In October, a compromised ConnectWise Cloud Backup credential was used against nearly 1,000 Entra tenants, with over 300 successful authentications, and Microsoft attributed the activity to Storm-0940.
Organizations using ScreenConnect should immediately review their environments for the affected third-party extensions and ensure that all identified extensions remain disabled. ConnectWise has advised organizations not to reinstall or re-enable these extensions until additional guidance becomes available. All technician workstations should be upgraded to ScreenConnect client version 26.6.5 or later, as ConnectWise has confirmed that these versions contain protections against the endpoint-to-technician propagation technique associated with this activity. The eSentire Threat Intelligence Team has released a security advisory and is continuing to track this topic for additional information and detection opportunities. Additionally, eSentire’s Threat Response Unit (TRU) is performing threat hunts for known IOCs and has blocked associated IP addresses via its Global Block List.
The threat briefing is a weekly intelligence overview for non-technical users. The Threat Intelligence team at eSentire investigates, analyzes, and organizes the most important events of the past week along with important security tips and redistributes the findings for quick reading. The main goal of this briefing is to improve the overall awareness of readers regarding cyber security.
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